I propose to lower fork threshold to 10% (from 20%) and fork period to 3.5 days (from 7 days).
By lowering the fork threshold, we increase alignment among those who stay while leaning into the fact that forks can be inherently good for Nouns.
We don't yet understand the full implications of having many separate funding bodies co-existing under one Nouns umbrella brand. But, Nouns being cc0, we're uniquely capable of leaning into the potential of having multiple funding bodies, each with different approaches but individually highly aligned.
Isn't a lower threshold just making it easier for arbitrageurs? It is widely understood that we need to accelerate spending to close the arbitrage opportunity. Yet, figuring out exactly how to thoughtfully accelerate spending is a process that takes time. In the meantime, it seems like we'll be co-existing with arbers and should make the most out of the situation. Lowering the threshold increases arber competition, accelerating the process, decreasing their profits, and allowing them to drain less of the treasury.
Doesn't inviting arbitrageurs disrupt governance? A lower threshold doesn't change that arbers will vote No on proposals and attempt to block spending. Conversely, it makes it less likely that arbers grow into a big cohort with significant voting power, which is a side effect of accumulating to reach the fork threshold.
Why not raise the threshold instead? While raising the threshold might seem like a good stopgap to defend the dao against further arbitrage, it comes with an air of intellectual dishonesty and risks being regressive, while not accomplishing that much in terms of protection.
Why decrease the fork period? One downside of a lower fork threshold and potentially consecutive forks is that proposal execution is blocked during the fork period. The fork period is decreased to mitigate governance disruption while still providing honest minorities ample time to coordinate.
Thanks to 40 and Elad for co-penning this proposal, and to Necfas for providing a Noun.